The Communication Turn in the Theory of Social Systems
Systems Research and Behavioural
Science (forthcoming)
Loet Leydesdorff
Science & Technology Dynamics
Department of Communication
Studies, Oude Hoogstraat 24
1012 CE Amsterdam, The Netherlands
loet@leydesdorff.net; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Abstract
The theory of social systems
has been contested as a part of sociology. Social order can be expected to
emerge as an expectation that is communicated. A communication can be provided
with meaning and meaning may evolve into codified meaning. The social system
can thus be considered as developing in layers of communication among reflexive
actors. At the interfaces between systems theory, communication theory, and
evolution theory puzzles emerge which can also be formulated as analytical and
empirical questions. The mathematical theory of communication can be used for
the clarification of the relations among these different perspectives, since a
message is expected to contain an information.
Introduction
Perhaps more than any other
science, sociology can be considered as a science in crisis (Gouldner, 1970).
Shortly after the Second World War, Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz—two of
the leading sociologists of that time—exchanged letters in which they ‘agreed
to disagree’ (Grathoff, 1978). The relative incommensurability between the
interactionist perspective on social action and macro-sociological analysis of
social systems and institutions was thereafter increasingly accepted. Giddens,
for example, stated that each of these two traditions of thought seems to have
respected the domain of the other: ‘The result has been a sort of mutual
accommodation, organized around a division of labour between micro- and
macro-sociological analysis’ (Giddens, 1981, p. 168).
The reduction of these research
programs to one perspective or another can only be a provisional solution for
the theoretical dilemma. The crisis cannot be disguised by calling the
discipline poly-paradigmatic, or solved by denying the very function of
theorizing; for example, by claiming priority for an ‘empirical’ orientation
towards ‘social problems’ using ‘middle-range’ theories. In my opinion, new
advances in the relevant theories enable us to specify a sociological theory of
communications that provides us with heuristics for and theoretical guidance in
sociological research. Three theories have to be specifically recombined:
1.
systems theory is necessary in order to understand the complexity of the
architecture, but the system’s operation has to be specified so that it includes
reflexive interactions. In other words, social systems should not be
reified;
2. a reformulation of communication
theory is required based on the analytical rigour of the mathematical
theory of communication, but further extended to appreciate the reflexive
character of inter-human communication; and
3. a reformulation of evolution
theory is needed in order to explain the dynamics of the system(s) under
study. Biological evolution theory cannot provide a sufficient basis for
explaining cultural evolution since this biological theory is part of
the cultural evolution.
The German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann specified this program of theory construction already in 1975:
No matter how abstractly formulated are
a general theory of systems, a general theory of evolution and a general theory
of communication, all three theoretical components are necessary for the
specifically sociological theory of society. They are mutually interdependent.
(...)
The decisive questions now
become: How are these various theories related to one another? What unifies
them? How must a theory that integrates them be constructed?[1]
At that time, Luhmann was
formulating his theory program in opposition to Habermas’ proposal for a theory
of communicative action (cf. Habermas and Luhmann, 1971). He
particularly wanted to combine a systems-theoretical perspective with a
communication-theoretical one. In his later work (e.g., 1984 and 1997) Luhmann
defined communication as the evolutionary operator of the social
system.
However, Luhmann failed to operationalize
communication in terms of available (e.g., mathematical) theories of
communication. Therefore, his systems theoretical notions have remained
insufficient for guiding empirical research and eventually hypothesis testing.
In the study of scientific communications, for example, citations can be used
as an instrument for the indexing, recall, and retrieval because one can expect
that these relations among documents are highly codified. The modelling enables
us to test empirical hypotheses, for example, the emergence of the modern
citation in the late 19th century (Leydesdorff and Wouters, 1999).
Habermas (1987) argued against
Luhmann that individuation and socialization are only possible on the basis of linguistic
structures. In my opinion, this critique touches the blind spot of
sociological systems theory as a meta-biology (Maturana, 1978; cf.
Leydesdorff, 2000). However, Habermas did not elaborate this perspective to a sociological
theory of communication. The communicative competencies of the actors are
not explained as a sociological variable, but based on the human embeddedness
in language as a social condition. Language is then not further analyzed as an
evolution of communication, but considered as a metabiologically given (cf.
Pinker, 1994).
Communication of
information and meaning
Whereas the paradigm shift from
action theory towards communication theory was fully reflected in Luhmann’s
sociology, the difference between the self-organization of social systems and
the autopoiesis of biological systems remained underspecified. As different
from biological systems, social communication systems allow for communication
about observations from within the system and/or from another perspective.
Observers are able to participate both in the variation and in the
relevant selections; Giddens (1976) introduced in this context the metaphor of
a ‘double hermeneutics.’
Through language the distinction
between uncertainty and meaningful information can be communicated, and the
implied codification can be changed reflexively without becoming confused. The
social system evolves by this complex dynamics of communication among reflexive
actors (Luhmann, 1986). A complex dynamics, however, can be decomposed into
subdynamics. As noted, among the relevant subdynamics are (1) the evolutionary
development of the system, (2) the communicative operation of the social
system, and (3) the reflexive reconstruction of the complex system. The three
theories (evolution theory, communication theory, and social systems theory)
that reflect on these subdynamics, have internal relations, but their semantics
are very different (Leydesdorff, 2001).
For example, the relation between
‘selection’ (evolution theory) and ‘meaning’ (communication theory) can be
specified: an uncertainty can be provided with meaning by making a distinction
between ‘signal’ and ‘noise’. The selection of ‘signals’ from the
‘noise’, however, can be made at each moment in time. Providing a system with meaning
assumes the capacity to make a comparison among possible selections and thus to
perform an operation over time.
Information,
uncertainty, and meaning
Shannon’s
(1948) definition of information as uncertainty has remained counterintuitive
(e.g., Brillouin, 1962; Bailey, 1994). Shannon detached himself from the sociological
implications by stating that “[t]hese semantic aspects of communication are
irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon & Weaver, 1949: 3).
However, his co-author Weaver (Ibid.: 116f.) observed in this connection:
The concept of information developed in this theory at first seems disappointing and bizarre—disappointing because it has nothing to do with the meaning, and bizarre because it deals not with a single message but rather with the statistical character of a whole ensemble of messages, bizarre also because in these statistical terms the two words information and uncertainty find themselves to be partners.
I think, however, that these should be only temporary reactions; and that one should say, at the end, that this analysis has so penetratingly cleared the air that one is now, perhaps for the first time, ready for a real theory of meaning.
Brillouin (1962) argued in favour
of a definition of ‘information’ as ‘meaningful information’ or ‘neg-entropy’.
Reduction of uncertainty, or the meaningfulness of information, however,
can only be defined with reference to a system. In general, a system can be
defined as a unity that is able to retain information by updating.
Substantive theorizing enables us
to specify a system of reference. Let us follow Luhmann (1984) in
distinguishing between individual (psychological) systems and social systems as
systems with potentially different dynamics for the update. Meaning assumes
an operation over time by an operating system that is able to update in terms
of repeatingly distinguishing between signals and noise. A second (time) axis
for the selection is added to the selections at each moment. Since one could
have provided the information with another meaning, one is also able to select
among possible meanings, that is, using a third axis for this selection.
In general, selection is a recursive
operation: some selections can be selected by a selecting system. For
example, selections can be selected for stabilization. In a next round,
the observable stabilizations can be considered as variations, but from the
perspective of a next-order selecting system. Stabilizations can then be
selected for globalization. Globalization can be considered as a
consequence of the recursive selection by a next-order system. The higher-order
systems build upon the lower-level ones by selecting among them.
Stabilization or codification is
a system’s mode of operation; globalization takes place under the pressure of a
(next-order) super-system. The initial selection underlying (potential)
stabilization can be considered as subsystemic. Selection without stabilization
remains subsymbolic. An identity is defined at a system’s level: it can
be considered as a codified and, therefore, symbolic stabilization of the
system, including its relation to the next-order system. For example, one can
ask with hindsight whether a unity has remained the same while changing.
An identifiable system can be
expected to develop along a trajectory, yet under selection pressure. At the
subsystemic level of a network uncertainty is expected to prevail. The network
structure operates at each moment, and under specific conditions this operation
may develop into a system. A supersystem remains latent in the form of selection
pressure on the systems and subsystems which are subsumed under it. Therefore,
its operation can be considered as a global regime from these
lower-level perspectives.
A self-organizing system is
additionally able to select (in the present) among its selections and
stabilizations using the additional degree of freedom of a global system for
the internal reflection. Thus, one is able to distinguish between a system that
is developing historically, that is, along a trajectory, and a self-organizing system
which has one more degree of freedom for adjusting to its environments with
hindsight. This super-system, however, exhibits itself only as the resilience
of a regime with reference to its ‘instantiations.’
The selective operation can be
used by a system to select upon the variations and selections of systems in its
environment and internally, that is, on lower levels. When repeated over
time, the selections generate couplings both horizontally and vertically
(Simon, 1973). When the couplings can be stabilized, the communication channels
can increasingly be considered as codifications of previous selections. The
communication can thenceforth be used as a signal by the selecting system(s).
The
probabilistic turn in communication theory
Communications
can be volatile and, therefore, difficult to observe. However, one is perfectly
able to measure communications in terms of change of the distributions. The
notion of probabilistic entropy enables us to understand the mechanism
of any system’s evolution using this communication-theoretical reflection. From
this perspective, that is, from a perspective different from evolution
theory, ‘variation’ and ‘selection’ can be considered as two sides of the same
coin: the observable variation provides us with a description of the deselected
cases. The system of reference for the selection remains to be identified
as the hypothesis of the research design.
In other words: the concept of
probability provides a common denominator for ‘selection’ and ‘variation,’
whereas these two operations were considered as independent in evolution
theory. An empirical event can be expected to occur (with a probability); yet
the occurrence of events remains uncertain because of selection pressure. There
is randomness (variation) and determination (selection) operating. While in
logic and mathematics one is able to deduce a consequence by making an
inference, one can no longer expect to be completely certain (nor completely
uncertain) in empirical domains.
Whenever a variation occurs that
is not completely random, one selection or another can be expected to have
operated. The variation could have been different. The two operations
(variation and selection) are ‘structurally coupled’ in the events. Whether the
result is to be considered as an observable variation or as a result of a
(hypothesized) selection depends on the perspective of the analyst. The system
of reference for the variation is different from that of the selection. In
classical evolution theory, for example, variation occurs at the species level,
while selection is attributed to nature as a super-system (that is, selection
is defined as ‘natural’).
The two concepts of ‘variation’
and ‘selection’ can thus be considered as different geometrical perspectives on
the algorithmic operation of generating probabilistic entropy. One needs an
information calculus for the specification of this operation
(Bar-Hillel, 1955; Leydesdorff, 1995). The notion of geometrical metaphors used
for the communication, however, brings language into play. The perspectives can
be considered as codified reflexively, that is, by using another selection for
the stabilization of the picture.
The linguistic turn in
the theory of communication systems
What does the information mean?
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication (implicitly) added a reflexive
turn to the reception: the signal can be considered as a message which contains
an expected information value. Upon reception, the signal can obtain an
update value for the receiving system. The system which receives the message is
able to provide the information contained in the message with meaning if this
system is sufficiently complex for the reflexive reconstruction of the
information contained in the message.
The observable variation can be
considered as a distribution. The message that this distribution has occurred
contains an uncertainty as its expected information content. The uncertainty is
defined as ‘yet content-free,’ that is, content-free before the
specification of a system of reference for the message. The specification of
a system of reference provides the uncertainty with meaning.
The uncertainty expressed in bits
of information is ‘not yet’ determined (Theil, 1972). One can determine it by
choosing a system of reference, or in other words, by adopting a perspective.
The uncertainty (i) is provided with meaning (j) by packaging it
into a message (ij). A message is part of a language and thus
language itself entails this reflexivity. The originally sent (Shannon-type)
information i has to be reconstructed at the receiving end as i’
by decomposing the message with reference to its a posteriori meaning j’.
Languages enable us to codify the
relation between the uncertainty and the meaning of a message. I deviate from
Luhmann’s social systems theory by considering language as the operating
system of society. Luhmann (1984) proposed that ‘meaning’ be considered as
the operator of social systems. ‘Meaning’ is then considered as a (given?)
precondition of both reflection and language (Luhmann, 1971). However, how this
operator is constructed by the recursion of communication was not yet
sufficiently reflected.
Meaning is generated interactively by using language.
It can be considered as a reflexive function of language at the level of the
social system (Pask, 1975). De Zeeuw (1993)
has elaborated Pask’s paradigm by emphasizing that in a social science design
“one has to look for ‘languages’ and ‘reports’, rather than for ‘laws’ and
‘facts’ ” (De Zeeuw, 1997). I submit that language is the evolutionary achievement which enables us to communicate
using two channels for the communication at the same time: a statement can be
provided with a meaning and it is expected to contain information.
The meaning of the communication
can be codified and thereby provisionally stabilized, but it can also be
changed (and exchanged!) with hindsight. Thus, the social system as the subject
of cultural evolution is able to reconstruct its history continuously while
operating reflexively and in a distributed mode. Both the uncertainty and the
meaning provided can be communicated, and the decomposition between signal and
noise can be revised accordingly, yet in an uncertain mode, that is, as a
distribution of selections by micro-level agencies. In other words, the whole
system doubles in the representation because the linguistic operation itself is
dually layered.
Languages enable us to codify the
meaning of the uncertainty in messages. This discursive reconstruction
is a recursive operation which generates a multi-layered system
endogenously. Lock-ins (in coevolutions) can emerge at each interface between
two layers. Because of the recursion various layers can be involved and then
there is an extending manifold of options for specific resonances. Cultural
evolution can be considered as the uphill search for overtones in these
interactions.
The
human agents and their communicative competences
In
addition to the ongoing exchanges of uncertainty and meaning, a third subdynamics
of the communication is provided by the human carriers of the communication as
far as they are competent and innovative in reconstructing and recombining the
options provided historically. The contextual historicity of these
communicative competencies provides the (super)system with another (that is,
third) selection mechanism. Because the actors are socially distributed, the
coevolution between the other two subdynamics (uncertainty and meaning) can be
made uncertain. The super-system (that is, the relatively global regime),
however, can only be built as next-order fragments on the observables, that is,
the hitherto stabilized variation. Thus, the reconstructive capacities of
reflexive and interactive agents become crucial to the further development
of the social network system.
Insofar as the social system was
first locked-in into a (cosmologically) given meaning, a high culture prevailed
(Innis, 1950). Unlocking this social system requires communicative resources
that reintroduce the uncertainties of what Habermas has called the ‘life-world’
into potentially new forms of codification. These new possibilities can be
explored and perhaps stabilized in local niches, potentially to be selected for
stabilization and globalization.
Cultural evolution once unleashed
drives the communicative competencies of the carriers, and the reflexive
recombinations undertaken by the latter remain a necessary condition for
further evolution. Human beings and social communications can thus be
considered as structurally coupled: what can be attributed as an action to a
person can at the same time be considered as a communication between people.
The inter-human communication can be codified using language.
Languages can further be codified
into symbolic media of communication like money, power or trust. The symbolic
media of communication enable us to shortcut and thus to accelerate the
communication (Künzler, 1989; cf. Parsons, 1963a and b). Communication media
can be developed insofar as they are functional to the organization of a
society. Functionality, however, presumes a super-system. This social
super-system was understood as a given ‘Nature’ during the individualistic
revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries. Upon its
globalization in the late 17th century, the Newtonian cosmology
legitimated processes of modernization and functional differentiation. The
(super)system of reference, however, was defined as universal during the 18th
century (Jacob 1988).
While “the book of nature” could
be considered as universal and as a Given in the Newtonian cosmology, Darwin’s
(1856) evolution theory introduced the notions of variation and ‘natural
selection.’ From this perspective,
‘nature’ is considered as an operation, notably ‘natural selection.’
Only the consequences of this operation—the variation of surviving species—can
be directly observed. Note that ‘selection’ has the epistemological status of
an hypothesis. Evolution theory, for example, made it possible to
conjecture a ‘missing link.’
From another perspective, Marx
(1848) used the evolutionary metaphor to describe social selection
processes. Although in his early writings selection by nature was not yet
distinguished from selection by history, this distinction is crucial to his
later ‘historical materialism’ (Marx, 1867). The two layers which were
then labeled ‘production forces’ and ‘production relations,’ are expected to
lock-in into a dialectics (Habermas, 1968).
When more than two subdynamics
interact, the resulting dynamics (“trilectics” or “triple helix”) become
complex (cf. Etzkowitz & Leydesdoff, 2000). The analytical specification of
the systems of reference is then crucial. Whereas Parsons (1937) had considered
‘action’ as the unit of the system’s operation, Luhmann’s social systems theory
provided a mirror-image of Parsons’s ‘structural functionalism’ by focusing on
‘interaction.’ According to Luhmann, the analysis of social structure should
not be based on (the aggregate of) action, but on the interactions terms
between actions. Interaction, however, constitutes a system of reference for
the observable events that is different from action or its aggregates. The
interaction terms can only be observed on the basis of an expectation.
Both Parsons and Giddens (and
also Habermas, 1981) have attributed actions to interacting actors and/or
aggregates of actors performing via institutions. Luhmann’s theory sides with
symbolic interactionism by defining human action in terms of its interactive
meaning at the network level (Blumer, 1969; cf. Mead, 1934). Linguistic acts,
however, differ from performative actions in important respects (Searle, 1969).
Luhmann (e.g., 1990) discussed this distinction in terms of the differences
between experience (‘Erleben’) and action (‘Handlung’). These categories,
however, were still defined anthropomorphically, that is, with reference to
human agents.
The reflections at the
sociological level are embedded in language (Searle, 1998) and, therefore, one
should specify the differences between ‘reception’ and ‘change’ in terms of a theory
of communication. A sociological theory of communication proceeds from
meta-biological or meta-psychological perspectives by enabling us to consider
the various positions (e.g., marxism, darwinism, structural-functionalism,
etc.) as social texts, that is, as metaphors with specific (e.g., explanatory)
functions. Social texts, however, can be deconstructed and gradually changed.
Language games and reflexive
paradigms span universes with embedded codes. The codes suggest specific
yardsticks for communications and expectations. Thus, the different universes
are contingent and potentially incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). In my opinion,
this post-modern position has become a predicament (Bernstein, 1995). In terms
of scientific inferences, however, the post-modern constellation does, in my
opinion, not mean that ‘anything goes’ (Feyerabend, 1975) because the
theoretical positions can always be specified. Yet, it means that all
perspectives can be considered as specific, even if they entail universalistic
claims.
From the perspective of a
sociological theory of communication, Luhmann’s (1975) ambition to combine a
general theory of society that integrates systems theory, communication theory,
and evolution theory can be labeled ‘grandiose’ both in the positive and in the
negative meaning of this word (Giddens, 1984, p. xxxvii). The tensions among
the noted (three) general theories, however, can drive the empirical research
programs of sociology because they can be expected to be reproduced. De Zeeuw’s
major contribution, in my opinion, has been the reflexive turning of this
tension to the construction of empirical designs.
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